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YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE WITHIN SYSTEMS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE CASE OF WILLIAM

SHRUBSALL
Simon I. Singer, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 1988, just one day before he was to deliver the
valedictorian address to his high school graduating class in Niagara
Falls, New York, William Shrubsall, at the age of 17, brutally
murdered his mother, and confused New York's system of juvenile
and criminal justice. There was confusion as to the reason for
defining Shrubsall as a criminal offender. In Niagara County
criminal court, Shrubsall was first sentenced as a criminal
offender, and then upon appeal in New York's Supreme Court
Department of Sociology, University at Buffalo, State University of New
York.
1 In detailing the specifics of Shrubsall's case, I draw on articles which
appeared in the Buffalo Evening News. The following articles are just those that
appeared during the last year. There are many articles that repeat the story of
Shrubsall from the time of his conviction and appeal, see, e.g., Shrubsall Trail
Faces FurtherDelay, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 8, 1998, at 5B; ShrubsallArraignedin
Canada,BUFF. NEws, Aug. 5, 1998, at 5B; Tighten State's Youthful-Offender
Law, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 4, 1998, at 2B; Suspect Had Been Arrested Four
Months Before Attacks Began, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 3, 1998, at IA; Did the
System Fail?; Bitter Debate Sparked by the Violent Aftermath of Shrubsall's
Release After 16 Months in Prison. BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 3, 1998, at IA; Area
Woman Pursuedby Shrubsall Recalls His Lies, His Mind Games. BUFF. NEWS,

Aug. 2, 1998, at 10A; The Secret Life of a PredatorDuring Two Years on the
Run. BUFF. NEws, Aug. 2, 1998, at IA; Prints Confirm Suspect is Shrubsall.
BUFF. NEWS, July 27, 1998, at IA; Despite Suicide Note, Shrubsall is Still
Sought as Fugitive in Sex Attack. BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 24, 1998, at lB.
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adjudicated a youthful offender. By overturning his original
disposition, three of the four New York's Supreme Court judges
viewed Shrubsall as ajuvenile deserving ofjuvenile justice.
Why one judge would view Shrubsall as more deserving of
juvenile justice than another judge has more to do with how
juvenile justice is reproduced in modem-day systems of criminal
justice than stated treatment-oriented objectives. Decision making
in systems of criminal and juvenile justice is based less on absolute
principles of justice, and more on an organizational process. That
process is one which has long ago substituted the idea of a singular
juvenile justice system for systems of justice in which decision
making is negotiated and decoupled among different sets of legal
decision makers. Juvenile justice is reproduced in systems of
criminal justice when some juveniles are considered more
deserving of treatment and less deserving of punishment than other
juveniles. Shrubsall's adjudication was overturned because he was
considered a good kid who happened to have committed a bad act
of crime. His status as the valedictorian of his high school allowed
the court to consider him deserving of a second chance and the
confidentiality that comes along with juvenile justice.
But the stated intent of juvenile justice was never just to
provide a second chance. It was also to provide rehabilitative
treatment. By rehabilitative treatment I mean something more than
just leaving a kid alone. It refers to a system of dealing with the
emotional, psychological, or sociological factors that lead
individuals to commit serious acts of violence. At the turn of the
century a juvenile justice system was created to go beyond the
punishment-oriented objectives of criminal justice which offered
the option of doing nothing, or administering adult-like
punishments to juveniles. Juvenile justice, by contrast, sought to
treat the causes of the juvenile's deviant, delinquent or criminal
behavior. With youthful offender status, Shrubsall was allowed to
satisfy the requirements of youthfifl offender status by pursuing a
degree at a prestigious Ivy League university and a promising
career as a stock analyst on Wall Street. Youthful offender status
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allowed the court to take note of his offensive behavior and his
chronological age as a juvenile. It allowed him to be placed on a
track that was quite different from less academically oriented
youth charged with the same offense.
The case of Shrubsall illustrates the loosely coupled way in
which rehabilitative treatment is secondary to the purpose of
tracking various delinquent and offender populations.2 This
tracking I see as fitting contemporary efforts to manage offenders
rather than to provide them with the treatment that they need to
avoid repeated criminal behavior. To confront juvenile justice in
the 2 1st century I conclude with a call for a tightly coupled system
of treating the most difficult offenders.

I.

RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE AND SHRUBSALL'S STATUS
AS A CRIMINAL OFFENDER

New York needed its youthful offender statute to deal with
the state's relatively low age of criminal responsibility. It is lower
than most states which begin assigning criminal responsibility to
juveniles at either 17 or 18. In New York, juveniles over the age of
sixteen are no longer eligible for juvenile court, technically known
as family court. New York's 1943 youthful offender law was
passed with the intent of providing juvenile justice within the
criminal court for those juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18.
The factors listed to be considered in granting Youthful offender
status are:
[T]he gravity of the crime and manner in which
it was committed, mitigating circumstances,
defendant's prior criminal record, prior acts of
violence, recommendations and presentence reports,
defendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with
2 For a discussion of the concept of loose coupling in the organizational
literature see generally PAUL DIMAGGIO AND WALTER POWELL. THE NEW
IN ORGANizATIONAL ANALYsIs. (University of Chicago

INSTITuTIONALISM

Press 1991).
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authorities, defendant's attitude toward society and
respect for the law, and the prospects for
rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive
life.3
The above factors draw on critical elements of juvenile
justice; they look to the principle of individualized justice and the
many ways in which offensive behavior interact with offender
characteristics. The defendant's reputation, cooperation, attitude
toward society, and respect for the law are considered the critical
predictors for rehabilitationand hopefor afuture constructive life.
In other words, juvenile justice and the youthful offender law
provided the Supreme Court justices with a way of discriminating
between those youth who are deserving of treatment and those who
are viewed as undeserving. But little more is stated as to what
should be the treatment beyond reduced sentence time and
confidentiality in the form of a sealed record.
Shrubsall seemed eligible for the second chance that
youthful offender status could provide. He had an excellent
reputation in the community and was first in his class
academically. He was a member of all the right kinds of youth
clubs. There was no gang affiliation to record for Shrubsall. As
editor of the school yearbook and a member of chorus, drama club,
math league, and student government, he was on the right path to
societal success as indicated by his acceptance to several
prestigious colleges and universities. Moreover, Shrubsall was able
to succeed academically despite the fact that he was a working
class boy from a working class town. His father, who worked in
the local chemical plant as a carpenter, died of cancer when
Shrubsall was only 14. He was raised by his widowed mother.
From the surface, Shrubsall exemplified the American dream of
working class success except for the fact that he killed his mother.
People v. Cruidcshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 334, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 336 (3d
Dept. 1985)
3
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So why did Shrubsall murder his only parent? The reason
that he gave is that he was a victim of his mother's abusive
behavior. Shrubsall claimed that he was physically and
psychologically tortured by his mother. He claimed he acted in
self-defense for his mother weighed over 300 pounds, and was
threatening to beat him for staying out late at night with his girl
friend. His statements of long term abuse were corroborated by his
mother's sister, Shrubsall's aunt. They received corroboration in
the expert testimony of law and psychology professor Charles
Ewing, who has written extensively on children who kill.
Several prominent members of the community affirmed
Shrubsall status as a good kid deserving of youthful offender status
and another chance. For instance, his high school principal wrote
that he was a good kid and unlikely to repeat his violent offense.
In Niagara County criminal court, Shrubsall's status as a good kid
was used to justify the reduction in his murder charges from
homicide to manslaughter. In the judgement of the court, there was
reason to assume extreme emotional disturbance in the brutal
murder of his mother. Instead of a prison sentence of 25 years to
life for homicide, Shrubsall agreed to a negotiated plea of guilty in
which he would be required to serve a prison sentence of five to
fifteen years.
Shrubsall then appealed his decision, was granted bail, and
while awaiting the decision of the state Supreme Court attended
Niagara University. During that two year period, he received
straight As in all course work. By granting Shrubsall youthful
offender status, the state Supreme Court sealed his criminal record
and allowed him to go on to the University of Pennsylvania.
Juvenile justice came to Shrubsall not as rehabilitative
treatment, but only as a minimal amount of time served and the
confidentiality of a sealed record. Youthful offender status gave
him the second chance to be accepted by a prestigious university
and to begin work on Wall Street as a securities analyst. He was
able to meet the stated requirement for youthful offender status.
The court's prediction for his rehabilitation seemed at first to be
the correct one.
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THE DIFFICULTY IN ADMINISTERING JUVENILE JUSTICE
WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Shrubsall appeared on the straight path to success until he
returned to Western New York. Soon he was charged repeatedly
for assault, particularly against women. His status as a University
of Pennsylvania alumnus allowed him to interview prospective
female students. Several students reported that Shrubsall harassed
them. Shrubsall was also charged with impersonating a police
officer when he threatened to arrest a woman he pulled over in his
car if she did not submit to his request for oral sex. The woman
reported the incident, but did not wish to press charges in court.
He was later convicted in Niagara County criminal court on May
15, 1998, for the first and third degree sexual assault of an
intoxicated seventeen-year-old girl.
Shrubsall then jumped bail and was sentenced in abstentia
for 2 1/3 to 7 years in prison. The same aunt who repeatedly
defended him in his court hearings lost $20,000 in bail money.
Shrubsall pretended to commit suicide by leaving a note that stated
he was going to jump into Niagara Falls. He then fled to Canada
where he assumed the alias of Ian Thor Greene. In Canada he soon
was arrested for several acts of assault, and while in jail was
identified as William Shrubsall. If convicted in Canada, he will
receive a sentence that combined with his U.S. convictions would
extend past the maximum length of his original manslaughter
conviction.
It is too easy in retrospect to say that Shrubsall should not
have been given youthful offender status. A more difficult line of
reasoning is one that suggests he never received juvenile justice.
What he did receive was juvenile justice within a system of
criminal justice. As a consequence, he never received the
rehabilitative treatment that is a stated part of juvenile justice.
Instead, juvenile justice within a system of criminal justice meant
leaving Shrubsall alone to face whatever caused him to commit his
assaults. The mistaken assumption is that simply allowing
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Shrubsall to maintain his academic and career path of societal
success was enough to prevent him from repeating his assaultive
behavior.
Shrubsall went from criminal to youthful offender to
chronic violent offender. As a consequence, I suggest that
Shrubsall was a victim of a loosely coupled system of juvenile
justice within criminal justice. The main advantage to loosely
coupled systems of justice is that they are on the surface cheaper to
operate. The reduced cost of administering juvenile justice within
the criminal court is reflected in several stated aspects of the
youthful offender law. For instance, Corriero cites New York's
Governor Dewey's memorandum supporting the youthful offender
act based on the savings that could subsequently be obtained
through elimination of an additional probation or preinvestigation
report.
[A]s a consequence of the shift of the
determination of youthful offender treatment to the
time of sentencing, only one probation report for
sentencing purposes will be compiled, the delay and
cost of unnecessary probationary reports will be
avoided and valuable probation resources will be
conserved and more productively reallocated.4
This is just one aspect of the cost savings that is associated
with the youthful offender law, and with juvenile justice in general.
But part of the savings that comes along with juvenile justice is the
fact that by giving youth a second chance, the state resigns itself to
doing nothing. In the process of doing nothing, the state waits for
juveniles to commit other offenses before doing something.
The courts were faced with the decision as to whether to
administer criminal justice by sentencing Shrubsall to an adult
penitentiary or to administer juvenile justice by allowing him to go
4

Corriero, Michael A., Outside Counsel; Youth Parts:Constructive Response

to the Challenge ofYouth Crime. N.Y.L.J. Oct. 26, 1990, at 1.
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free. There was no system of juvenile justice in which he could
have been placed for New York ended juvenile status at 16. By not
having the availability of a juvenile justice system in which he
could have received a disposition that was less severe than the
adult penalty of manslaughter, the state resigned itself to youthful
offender status and doing nothing to deal with Shrubsall's first
offense. By ignoring all the complex factors that led to his
murdering his mother, the state left Shrubsall free to move on with
his life and to repeat his violent offenses.
IL.

REPRODUCING LOOSELY COUPLED SYSTEMS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE

The New York State Supreme Court needed the state's
1948 youthful offender act to distinguish Shrubsall from youth
who were undeserving of treatment. By overturning Niagara
County's adjudication of Shrubsall, the Supreme Court ruled that
he was more deserving of youthful offender status and
rehabilitative treatment. But this did not come in the form of any
treatment program. Instead, what Shrubsall received in the form of
youthful offender status is a youth discount, a reduction in the
length of his sentence, and the confidentiality that is a cardinal part
of juvenile justice. Treatment essentially consisted of leaving
Shrubsall alone.
Juvenile justice and New York's youthful offender act were
created not just for the purpose of giving juveniles a second
chance. They were a way of maintaining confidentiality and
reducing the cost of administering justice. The stated reasons for
confidentiality is to protect the records of juveniles. But it is also
for the unstated purpose of protecting officials from public review.
Confidentiality requirements allow officials, especially in less
sensational cases than Shrubsall's, to escape the external public
demands for criminal punishment. The 1943 youthful offender
legislation stated that hearings "may be private and shall be
conducted in such parts of the court or judges' chambers as shall be
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separate and apart from the other parts of the court which are then
being held for proceedings pertaining to adults charged with
crimes. 5
But society's need to see its offenders punished, especially
for serious violent offenses, could only take place in criminal
courts where records are not sealed and decision making is subject
to public review. This is why waiver legislation exists to allow the
transfer of juveniles to criminal court for serious violent offenses.
Such legislation provides a safety valve for satisfying society's
need to see the offender punished no matter what his or her age
may be. Similarly, a safety valve in terms of bringing juveniles
into the adult legal process is also provided through youthful
offender legislation and reverse waiver procedures." In other
words, despite the stated principles of punishment and treatmentoriented forms of justice in juvenile and criminal courts, there is
room to negotiate.
There is a negotiated order in all modem-day systems of
juvenile and criminal justice that allows for the loose coupling that
exists between legal decision makers. The best interests of justice
are interpreted differently among various sets of legal officials.
Part of the difference is related to the unique position that officials
find themselves in, or their unique organizational concerns and
interests. For example, the interests and concerns of Niagara
County's criminal court judge in adjudicating Shrubsall a criminal
offender is different than that of New York's Supreme Court
judges in adjudicating him a youthful offender. Going beyond
statements, such as the best interests ofjustice, requires us to look
at specific organizational concerns and interests that make it
difficult to implement juvenile justice within a system of criminal
justice. The Niagara County criminal court judge is elected, and,
therefore, responsive to community concerns and the public
'
6

Id. at 4.
See generally SIMON I. SINGER. RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT

JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM.

New York 1996).

(Cambridge University Press:
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interests to see Shrubsall punished. Youthful offender status makes
it possible to escape public review by sealing a youth's record.
Still in the absence of a singular juvenile justice system in
which to respond to Shrubsall and other violent youth, the state is
faced with the alternative of doing nothing. Within a system of
criminal justice, there is none of the rehabilitative treatment that
characterizes juvenile justice. Any attempt to do so is in the
absence of the mental health and social work professionals that are
trained to deal with juveniles in a juvenile justice system.
Moreover, it is difficult to gauge the needs of juveniles within a
criminal justice system because that system is geared towards adult
offenders.
The loosely coupled characteristics of juvenile justice allow
the weight of factors that go into legal decision making to be a
great mystery. Delinquents, according to David Matza, are
mystified by juvenile justice. They fail to understand the
justifications for their adjudication and disposition.7 They hear
through an ideology ofjuvenile justice that they are not responsible
for their offenses, that there are other factors that come into play
such as his social environment and, as in the case of Shrubsall,
physical and psychological abuse. When eligibility for juvenile
justice is cited and something else happens in the form of criminal
punishment, juveniles sense injustice. They are mystified by a
legal process in which they expect treatment and instead receive
punishment. Similarly, delinquents are mystified when they expect
treatment and actually receive nothing to deal with whatever
factors led to their delinquent or criminal behavior.
There was no singular system ofjuvenile justice or criminal
justice in which Shrubsall could have received the kind of
treatment or punishment that made him accountable for his past
offense, and that may have prevented him from his subsequent
victimization of other women. If there were a singular system of
7

See generally DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr 111-36 (1964).
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juvenile justice, Shrubsall would have been subject to a penalty
that was less extreme than the minimum of five years in an adult
penitentiary. If he were placed in a system of juvenile justice, he
would have been required to suffer some of the consequences of
his offense within a treatment-oriented environment. Such a
system is difficult to define and expensive to implement. It is much
cheaper, as I have already stated, to keep our systems of justice
loosely defined.
Modem-day systems of justice are developing new ways to
implement juvenile justice. The adult penalties in systems of
criminal justice require officials to discriminate even more
between those juveniles who are considered deserving and
undeserving of treatment. For example, New York's 1978 juvenile
offender law expanded waiver legislation to incorporate a wider
range of violent offenses. These offenses gave officials the
discretion to decide which juveniles are deserving of treatment and
which ones are deserving of punishment in criminal court. In my
book, Recriminalizing Delinquency: Violent juvenile crime and
juvenile justice reform, I detail the creation and implementation of
New York's juvenile offender law. One of the major findings of
my study is that minorities are more likely to be defined as
deserving of criminal punishment than majority juveniles. Black
juveniles are arrested as criminal offenders for less serious
offenses, and are more likely to be convicted in criminal court.
Moreover, convicted black juveniles are more likely to be
incarcerated even though they are charged with less serious
offenses than white juveniles.
Other case processing data show that juveniles who reside
with single parents are more likely to be indicted as criminal
offenders than those who reside in dual parent households. Race
and parental configuration are just a few variables that may help us
to understand how officials distinguish between those juveniles
who are deserving and undeserving of juvenile justice. School
performance is another likely indicator that officials look to in
determining whether a juvenile should be defined as an offender or
a delinquent.
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The reproduction of juvenile justice and the division
between youth deserving and undeserving of treatment can be
viewed in terms of what Stanley Cohen refers to as YARVIS
(Young, attractive, Rich, Verbal, Intelligent and Successful).! It is
the YARVIS person in society that officials want to work with and
define as deserving of treatment. Non-YARVIS youth are not
likely to be seen as deserving of treatment. They instead are
subject to exclusionary forms of control; the kinds of placements
that keep them out of society's mainstream.
By placing juveniles on a complex set of legal tracks in
which some are labeled as delinquents, and others as youthful or
juvenile offenders, officials avoid or delay implementing stated
treatment and punishment oriented objectives. The initial mandate
of the juvenile court to treat all juveniles as delinquents is
superseded by other reforms that attempt to get tough on certain
juveniles for certain serious categories of offenses. In criminal
court, there is room for juvenile justice but only in a way that is
likely to increase disparities and increase the ways in which some
juveniles are punished more than others. This punishment is not
based on the offenses that juveniles have committed, but on who
they are which is interpreted within a particular organizational
process.
The case of William Shrubsall illustrates how an
organizational process can be used to manipulate stated treatment
objectives by the way in which the New York Supreme Court
decoupled the decision making of Niagara County's criminal court.
For one set of officials it was in the interests of justice to label
Shrubsall a criminal, for another it was in the interest of justice to
label him a youthful offender. Punishment and treatment merge to
create a variety of legal routes that shift the retributory goals of the
criminal court to rehabilitative ones. A rehabilitative-treatment
ideology makes sense in a system of juvenile justice where
8

Compare STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL:

PuNISHMENT AND CLASSIFCATION 153 (1985).

CRIME,
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something is done to deal with whatever troubled behavior that led
to an act of delinquency or crime. There is no reason to assume
that juvenile justice is any different from criminal justice if the end
result is simply doing nothing, and waiting till the offender repeats
an offense.
CONCLUSION

Loosely coupled systems of juvenile and criminal justice
make it difficult to hold any part of the system accountable for its
stated treatment or punishment objectives. The State Supreme
Court of New York is not a juvenile court. It could not mandate the
necessary treatment to deal with the apparent psychological and
emotional problems of Shrubsall. All it could do was give
Shrubsall a second chance and ignore the complex set of personal
or psychological circumstances that led him to murder his mother.
The question that remains is whether the many women he
victimized subsequent to receiving youthful offender status might
have been saved by his treatment in a juvenile justice system. It is
too easy to say in retrospect that he should have been denied
youthful offender status, and that he should have simply been
subject to criminal punishment. It was for good reason that the
New York Supreme Court justices felt it was in the interest of
justice for a 17 year-old-youth with no prior history of offending
and an excellent academic history not be sentenced as an adult
offender.
But by denying the possibility of juvenile justice or by
simply assuming that juvenile justice could be administered within
a system of criminal justice, the real reasons for Shrubsall's
assaultive behavior was ignored. By insisting on youthful offender
status within a system of criminal justice, juvenile justice is
bypassed and in the process denied. Systems of juvenile and
criminal justice are decoupled even further from each other in an
effort to produce a variety of legal tracks that further confuse the
reasons for treating and punishing youth such as Shrubsall.
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As I have argued repeatedly, there is no singular system of
juvenile and criminal justice. Instead Shrubsall faced a multitude
of systems. In the criminal court, he was subject to a system that
identified him as a criminal offender. In New York's Supreme
Court, he was subject to a system that identified him as a youthful
offender. The interests and concerns of each court produced the
loosely connected subsystems in which there was little agreement
as to how Shrubsall should have been treated. For the public there
was a heightened level of frustration attached to Shrubsall's case.
That is, there was no singular identifiable system to blame, because
of the multitude of legal avenues that he faced in his adjudication
in criminal and the New York Supreme Court.
At this point it would be too easy to state that the problem
with juvenile justice is simply that there is not enough treatment or
that there is not enough punishment, or that youthful offender
status or even juvenile justice should simply be abolished for those
who commit serious offenses. There is little real interest in
eliminating our juvenile justice systems. Instead of thinking about
ways to eliminate juvenile justice through get-tough reforms that
transfer juveniles to the adult criminal court, we should think of
ways to better coordinate the treatment that delinquents and
offenders obviously need. This is not a new idea. It dates back to
the founding of the first juvenile courts.
But as I noted earlier it has become increasingly difficult to
hold our systems of juvenile justice accountable for treatment
when they are not tightly coupled around any singular objective. If
there has been a juvenile court to deal with Shrubsall initially, that
court could have mandated in a much more efficient manner the
treatment that he really needed. This might have involved
residential placement for emotionally disturbed youth, or continued
monitoring of his behavior. Shrubsall, in his fake suicide note,
articulated the very reasons for juvenile justice. They are to spare
kids the possibility of long term sentences among older more
vicious criminal offenders. It is also to give kids the guidance they
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need to create a life that would allow them to survive in this
complex modem world.
[Y]ears filled with rapes at the hands of HIVinfected inmates and frequent stabbing (probable
death) as an accused sex offender. It is all my fault I
lost for two reasons: 1) because I allowed myself to
set foot in this awful county again after graduation,
and 2) because I agreed not to testify. I was a liar
and a deceiver, and a 'sexual predator' because I
could not prove otherwise having stood mute. I
have nothing: no family (except for you), no
friends, no girlfriend or wife, no money, no job, no
prospects, meaningless education.., and mountains
of debt. Most of all, no hope. I meant to do this
earlier, but I haven't had the guts. So tonight I...
got drunk and walked down to the Falls. To my
knowledge, no one has ever survived the American
Falls. I don't think I will either.9
Of course, prison is an awful place and it is not the sort of
place where the Supreme Court judges wanted to send any
juvenile, let alone one that was an honor student with no prior
convictions. Obviously, Shrubsall may have exaggerated the depth
of his problems to convince the reader that he was serious about
suicide. Still the note reflects a sense of despair and emotional
problems that are beyond the retributory punishment oriented goals
of the state and its system of criminal justice. No one is sentenced
to prison to be raped and to become HIV infected. But the
perception of this reality makes it difficult not only for offenders to
trust the nature and extent of their state systems of punishment, but
9 Did the System Fail?; Bitter Debate Sparked by the Violent Aftermath of

Shrubsall's Release After 16 Months in Prison,BUFF. NEws, Aug. 3, 1998, at
IA. Quoting William Shrubsall's suicide note.
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also for officials to sentence juveniles within an exclusionary
system of criminal justice.
A coordinated system of caring for the most difficult
juveniles requires creative organized ways of bringing subsystems

of justice together. We have seen coordination in governmental
responses to certain types of adult crimes. A high level of
coordination and accountability was produced when legislators, the
police, prosecutors, and judges agreed that drug dealers should be
incarcerated, leading to part of the dramatic rise in the US prison
population. For New York and other states the real task is to
develop a tightly coordinated system of juvenile justice for dealing
with the most difficult and troubled juveniles, youth such as
William Shrubsall.

